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SECURITIES REGULATION
George Lee Flint, Jr. *
ECURITIES regulation deals primarily with the laws preventing
and providing remedies for fraud in the sale of stocks and bonds.
This article focuses on securities regulation in Texas,1 and touches
on federal securities law when necessary. 2 This article is not, however,
intended to exhaust all aspects of securities regulation, instead it is meant
to update Texas-based securities practitioners with new developments of
interest.
I. COVERAGE OF THE SECURITIES ACTS
The definitions-especially those relating to what constitutes a secur-
ity, who may recover, and the territorial reach-determine the scope of
the securities acts. The Fifth Circuit narrowed the types of fraud that are
covered by the Texas Securities Act ("TSA") by holding that the TSA did
not cover fraud in connection with interest rate swaps. 3 In contrast, the
Texas Supreme Court, in dicta, expanded the scope of the TSA by finding
that the TSA does have extra-territorial reach for those victimized by
Texas-based sales. 4 The importance of these scope questions is that the
TSA allows recovery of attorney's fees and provides for liability for situa-
tions not permitted under other states' securities laws.
A. DEFINITION OF SECURITY
The Fifth Circuit, in a non-precedential decision, narrowed the types of
fraud that the TSA covers by limiting the definition of "security. ' 5 Many
purported fraud victims assert a claim under the Texas Securities Act in
* H. Andy Professor of commercial Law, St. Mary's University School of Law, San
Antonio, Texas; B.A., 1966, B.S., 1966, M.A., 1969, University of Texas at Austin; Nuc. E.
1969, Massachusetts Institute of Technology; Ph.D. (Physics), 1973, J.D. 1975, University of
Texas at Austin.
1. Texas has two major statutes to combat securities fraud: The Texas Securities Act
[hereinafter TSAI and the Texas Stock Fraud Act [hereinafter TSFA]. See TEX. REV. CIv.
STAT. ANN. art. 581 (Vernon Supp. 2008) (TSA); TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 27.01
(Vernon 2002 & supp. 2008) (TSFA).
2. Since the Texas Legislature based portions of the TSA on the federal securities
statutes and Texas courts rely on federal decisions to interpret the corresponding sections
of the TSA, this article also examines federal developments in the Fifth Circuit. See TEX.
REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 581-33 cmt. to 1977 Amendment (Vernon Supp. 2008).
3. K3C Inc. v. Bank of Am., N.A., 204 F. App'x 455, 465 (5th Cir. 2006).
4. Citizens Ins. Co. of Am. v. Daccach, 217 S.W.3d 430 (Tex. 2007), rev'd 105 S.W.3d
712 (Tex. App.-Austin 2003).
5. K3C Inc., 204 F. App'x at 465.
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order to recover attorney's fees. 6 The Fifth Circuit faced a case involving
an alleged fraudulent omission with respect to an interest rate swap under
the TSA, along with numerous other claims.7 The Securities and Ex-
change Commission ("SEC") had enforced federal securities laws against
those engaged in fraudulent interest rate swaps, contending the swaps in-
volved securities. 8 But more recently, Congress specifically excluded in-
terest rate swaps from the definition of "security" in both the Securities
Act of 1933 ("SA") and the Exchange Act of 1934 ("EA").9 Although
the TSA defines "security" similarly, it does not contain this exclusion.
In K3C Inc. v. Bank of America, N.A., 10 a bank entered into a hedging
plan with a borrower which involved interest rate swaps that reduced the
customer's interest rate risk and generated fees for the bank. In addition
to paying its normal interest payments during each pay period, the bor-
rower would receive payments from the bank if interest rates went above
a set fixed interest rate. On the other hand, the borrower would pay ad-
ditional amounts if interest rates went below the set fixed interest rate.
The plan also had a ceiling provision; if interest rates rose above a speci-
fied level above the fixed interest rate, no payments would be due by the
bank during such period. The borrower made several payments under
the plan, then cut its losses by terminating the interest rate swap and paid
off its loans to the bank, but refusing to pay the interest rate swap termi-
nation fee. The borrower then sought to recover the monies paid under
the interest rate swap alleging several causes of action including one
under the TSA. The trial court ruled against the borrower on all its
claims and in favor of the bank on its contractual counterclaim. The Fifth
6. See TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 581-33D(7) (Vernon Supp. 2008) (allowing
injured investors to recover attorney's fees if a court finds that such recovery would be
equitable).
7. K3C Inc., 204 F. App'x at 465.
8. The Securities and Exchange Commission [hereinafter SEC] has obtained settle-
ment agreements from a broker and its agent for selling treasury-linked interest rate swaps
with cap options at values that the broker's sophisticated calculations significantly under-
stated potential losses. See Vazquez, Exchange Act Release No. 33-7269 (Feb. 29, 1996);
BT Secs. Corp., Exchange Act Release No. 33-7124 58 SEC Docket 1145 (Dec. 22, 1994).
Consequently, the Securities and Exchange Commission at that time viewed interest rate
swaps as securities, subject to the anti-fraud rules of the Exchange Act of 1934.
9. After the interest rate swap transaction involved in the Fifth Circuit's case, Con-
gress passed the Commodity Futures Modernization Act of 2000, Pub. L. 106-554, Appen-
dix E, 114 Stat. 2763 (2000), to promote innovation of various derivatives by removing
federal regulation. The act amended both the SA and the EA, to exclude swap agreements
from the definition of "security" contained in those two acts. See 15 U.S.C.A. § 78c cmt.
(West Supp. 2008) (explaining the definitions of "swap agreement," "security based swap
agreement," and "non-security based swap agreement"); 15 U.S.C.A. § 77b-1 (West Supp.
2008) (the exclusion from the SA); 15 U.S.C.A. § 78c-1 (West Supp. 2009) (the exclusion
from the EA). The idea is to remove interest rate swaps, among other types of swaps, from
the registration requirements and regulations of the SEC, yet retain application of the
EA's anti-fraud provisions to "security based swap agreements." See 15 U.S.C.A.
§ 78j(a)(2) (West Supp. 2008) (subjecting "security based swap agreements" to the anti-
fraud rules of the SEC).





The Fifth Circuit held that interest rate swaps were not securities under
the TSA, and therefore no cause of action arose under the TSA.12 Al-
though there were no prior decisions under the TSA, 13 the Fifth Circuit
found one federal case under the federal securities acts' old definition of
"security" which established that interest rate swaps were not securities.14
Consequently, the Fifth Circuit decided that these interest rate swaps
were not securities.15
B. EXTRA-TERRITORIAL EXTENT
The Texas Supreme Court, in dicta, finally made a pronouncement on
the extra-territorial reach of the TSA. 16 The Act at least applies to regis-
tration of issuers and dealers as sellers of securities for offers and sales
originating in Texas. This confirms some positions taken by the State Se-
curities Board (the "Board') and the Texas Appellate Courts calling for
the registration of securities and selling agents when offers and sales are
made from Texas. 17 Specifically, the case involved the certification of a
11. See id. at 467.
12. See id. at 465.
13. Since the Texas Legislature based portions of the TSA on the federal securities
statutes, Texas courts rely on federal decisions to interpret the corresponding sections of
the TSA. See, e.g., TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 581-33 cmt. to 1977 Amendment
(Vernon Supp. 2008). The definition of "security" is one of those corresponding sections.
See, e.g., First Mun. Leasing Corp. v. Blankenship, Potts, Aikman, Hagin & Stewart, P.C.,
648 S.W.2d 410, 414 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1983, writ ref'd n.r.e.) (the decisions under the SA
serve as a guide to the definition of "security" under the TSA because of the almost identi-
cal wording of the two statutes).
14. A district court found that the interest rate swap did not satisfy the requirements
for the most likely portions of the definition of "security" under the SA for "investment
contracts; ...notes; .. . evidence of indebtedness; . . .options on securities; and ...
instruments commonly known as securities"). See Lehman Bros. Commercial Corp. v.
Minmetals Int'l Non-Ferrous Metals Trading Co., 179 F. Supp. 2d 159, 164, 167 (S.D.N.Y.
2001) (following Proctor & Gamble without analysis for the New York securities act); see
also Proctor & Gamble Co. v. Bankers Trust Co., 925 F. Supp. 1270, 1277-83 (S.D. Ohio
1996). Proctor & Gamble used horizontal commonality (a promoter and several pooled
investors) for the investment contract analysis, while the Fifth Circuit itself permits vertical
commonality (one promoter and one investor), see, e.g., Long v. Shultz Cattle Co., 881 F.2d
129, 140 (5th Cir. 1989), as do Texas courts. See, e.g., Searsy v. Commercial Trading Corp.,
560 S.W.2d 637, 640 (Tex. 1977). Proctor & Gamble found no investment contract in an
interest rate swap since there was only one customer. Had the Fifth Circuit considered
vertical commonality for the investment contract analysis for the interest rate swap, the
Fifth Circuit would not likely change its conclusion, since for vertical commonality the
Fifth Circuit also requires that the profit come from the promoter's efforts, not market
forces affecting the interest rate.
15. See 204 F. App'x at 465.
16. Citizens Ins. Co. of Am. v. Daccach, 217 S.W.3d 430, 430 (Tex. 2007), rev'd 105
S.W.3d 712 (Tex. App.-Austin 2003).
17. See 7 TEX. ADMIN. CODE § 139.7 (2008) (exempting offers and sales from Texas by
issuers and selling agents to non-residents outside of Texas from securities registration, but
providing that such issuers and selling agents are dealers required to register unless other-
wise exempt from registration, only take the selling materials outside Texas themselves,
only receive money sent to Texas from the non-resident purchasers, or only perform cleri-
cal functions in Texas with respect to the closing of the sale). The exemption for securities
registration implies that, unless under the exemption, securities must also be registered
2008] 1109
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class action securities lawsuit. The court had to determine whether ques-
tions of law or fact common to the members outweighed any such ques-
tions affecting only individual members of the class. In Citizens Insurance
Co. of America v. Daccach,18 the issuer, an out-of-state corporation, had
its principal place of business in Texas. The issuer's subsidiary sold life
insurance policies through foreign insurance agents exclusively to persons
outside of the United States. The policies allowed the policyholders to
assign their policy dividends to offshore trusts that used them to purchase
common stock of the issuer, which was listed on an American exchange.
The issuer had not registered any of its sales force anywhere as securities
dealers. The issuer asserted that the life insurance policies were not sub-
ject to regulation in any of the countries in which the policyholders lived.
Two foreign shareholders that had acquired their shares through their life
policies filed a class action in Texas, alleging, inter alia, a violation of the
TSA because the securities had been sold from Texas through unregis-
tered dealers and agents.19 One of the shareholders sought class certifica-
tion with himself as the class representative but only for the TSA
violation cause of action. The trial court granted the certification without
analyzing the law of other jurisdictions. On an interlocutory appeal, the
appellate court, with a one-word modification, upheld the class
certification.
The Supreme Court decertified the class on non-securities law
grounds,20 rendering its pronouncement on the securities law aspect
dicta. 21 The issuer claimed error from the trial court's failure to analyze
the laws of other jurisdictions in determining whether there were com-
mon questions of law for the class. The issuer misunderstood the law.
when the offer and sale is made from Texas to non-resident investors. In the late 1970s the
State Securities Board's rules so provided.
For the court positions, see Enntex Oil & Gas Co. v. State, 560 S.W.2d 494, 495-96, 498
(Tex. Civ. App.-Texarkana 1977, writ ref'd n.r.e.) (found violation of the Texas Securities
Act for selling unregistered securities, namely oil and gas interests, through unregistered
selling agents to non-Texas residents by mailing material from Texas and making telephone
calls from Texas); Rio Grande Oil Co. v. State, 539 S.W.2d 917, 918, 921 (Tex. Civ. App.-
Houston [1st Dist.] 1976, writ ref'd n.r.e.) (found violation of the Texas Securities Act for
selling unregistered securities, namely oil and gas interests, to non-Texas residents by mail-
ing material from Texas, making telephone calls from Texas, and making glowing reports of
the program to non-residents visiting Texas).
For more recent pronouncements, see, e.g., Greenberg Traurig of N.Y., P.C. v. Moody,
161 S.W.3d 56, 63, 67, 102 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 2004, no pet.) (out-of-state
aider and abetter of fraud); Grant Thornton L.L.P. v. Suntrust Bank, 133 S.W.3d 342, 361
(Tex. App.-Dallas 2004, pet. denied) (out-of-state victims of instate fraud); George Lee
Flint, Jr., Securities Regulation, 58 SMU L. REV. 1135, 1139-42 (2005) (discussing Green-
berg Traurig and Grant Thornton).
18. Daccach, 217 S.W.3d at 430; see also George Lee Flint., Jr., Securities Regulation,
58 SMU L. REV. 1135, 1139 n.24 (2005) (discussing Citizens Ins. Co. of Am. v. Daccach,
105 S.W.3d 712 (Tex. App.-Austin 2003), rev'd 217 S.W.3d 430 (Tex. 2007)).
19. See TEX. REV. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 581-12(A) (Vernon Supp. 2008) (prohibiting
"person[s], firm[s], corporation[s], or dealer[s]," directly or through agents from offering or
selling securities in this state without first registering).
20. The class representative did not adequately represent the class since he abandoned
the other issues in the lawsuit.
21. See 217 S.W.3d at 460.
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An action for failure to register as a dealer of or selling agent for securi-
ties does not result in a conflict of laws analysis. Securities laws generally
operate concurrently meaning that the laws of multiple jurisdictions may
apply to a transaction.2 2 For offers made from Texas to nonresidents, the
Texas dealer registration requirements of the TSA apply,23 providing the
commonality of questions of laws to all members of the class regardless of
the laws of other jurisdictions. So the only issue remaining is whether the
application of the TSA for dealer registration for offers and sales to non-
residents violated constitutional limits. The need for the state to protect
its own securities industry from a fraudulent reputation and its TSA-com-
pliant dealers from unlawful competition satisfied constitutional
requirements.
22. See, e.g., Unif. Sec. Act of 2002, § 610(c) ("[Offers in this State.] For the purpose
of this section, an offer to sell or to purchase a security is made in this State, whether or not
either party is then present in this State, if the offer: (1) originates from within this State; or
(2) is directed by the offeror to a place in this State and received at the place to which it is
directed."); id. cmt. 3 ("Section 610(c) provides that an offer which originates in State B
and is directed to State A is made in both states. The securities act of State A would apply
under Section 610(c)(2). The act of State B would apply also, under Section 610(c)(1).
The intent is to prevent a seller in State B from using that state as a base of operations for
defrauding person in other states.").
Before 1996, the federal securities laws and the state securities laws applied concur-
rently. See, e.g., 48 Stat. 74, 85 (1934) (Section 18: "Nothing in this title shall affect the
jurisdiction of the securities commission (or any agency or office performing like functions)
of any State or Territory of the United States, or the District of Columbia, over any secur-
ity or any person."). Congress modified this concurrency, starting in 1996, by preempting
state securities laws for certain securities matters. The National Securities Markets Im-
provements Act of 1996 preempted some broker regulations by the states. See 15 U.S.C.S.
§ 78o(h) (LEXIS 2008) (states can not regulate extension of credit by dealers or impose
capital or recordkeeping requirements). The subject action falls outside of that proscrip-
tion. The Securities Litigation Uniform Standards Act of 1998 barred most class actions
involving fraud for publicly traded securities. See, e.g., 15 U.S.C.A. § 77p(b) (West Supp.
2008) (barring class actions involving more than fifty persons for fraud claims under state
law with respect to covered securities); id. § 77r(b) (covered securities include those on the
exchanges). The subject class action dealt with dealer registration, not fraud under the
TSA.
23. The TSA has this same "in this state" language as does the Uniform Securities Act.
See TEX. REV. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 581-12(A) (Vernon Supp. 2008) ("Except as provided
in Section 5 of this Act, no person, firm, corporation or dealer shall, directly or through
agents, offer for sale, sell or make a sale of any securities in this state without first being
registered as in this Act provided. No agent shall, in behalf of any dealer, sell, offer for
sale, or make sale of any securities within the state unless registered as an agent for that
particular registered dealer under the provisions of this Act."). The Texas State Securities
Board has made it clear, under its authority to make exemptions from this statutory sec-
tion, TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 581-12(C) (Vernon Supp. 2008), that this covers offers
and sales made from Texas to non-residents. See 7 TEX. ADMIN. CODE § 139.7(b) (2008)
("Sale of Securities to Nonresidents.... An issuer or selling agent who makes an offer or
sale from Texas, by any means, including use of the mail or telephone, is a dealer and must
comply with the dealer registration requirements of the Securities Act .... An offer is not
deemed to be made from Texas merely because offering material is prepared in Texas, if




II. ORGANIZATION OF THE STATE SECURITIES BOARD
The TSA created the Board to handle the registrations required by the
TSA and to serve as an enforcement agency. The Board views the major
threats to Texas investors to be Ponzi schemes, unlicensed securities sell-
ers, unregistered investment products, promissory notes issued by those
unable to deliver promised returns, fraudulent or unsuitable opportuni-
ties targeted toward certain demographic groups, high-yield investments,
internet fraud, variable annuity sales practices, and oil and gas scams.
24
The Board made two changes to facilitate its record-keeping function.
The Board amended its form for requesting reduced fees for certain per-
sons registered in multiple capacities by updating cross references to the
rules setting out the criteria and procedures for using the form.25 The
Board also updated its rule covering charges for copying public records to
reflect the relocation of state copy charges rules from the Texas Building
and Procurement Commission to the Office of the Attorney General.
26
III. REGISTRATION OF SECURITIES
The basic rule of most securities laws is that securities need to be regis-
tered with their corresponding regulatory agency unless they fall within
an exemption. With respect to exemptions from registration, the Board
amended one exemption rule and issued two no-action letters. The
Board's enforcement actions focused on issuers failing to register their
securities and those making misleading statements to aid their sales.
The Board amended its rule exempting listed securities to reflect the
2001 statutory amendments recognizing the name change of the Midwest
Stock Exchange to the Chicago Stock Exchange, and to include a defini-
tion of the statutory "national market system of the NASDAQ stock mar-
ket" to reflect recent changes in that market to include certain
submarkets. 27
The staff of the Board issued two no-action letters with respect to ex-
emptions from registration. One dealt with the conversion of a Texas
corporation into a Delaware corporation to operate as a cooperative
24. See, e.g., Press Release, Texas State Secs. Board, Secs. Comm'r Identified Top 10
Treaty to Texas Investors Governor Perry Proclaims, "April Savings and Investing Month"
(Apr. 6, 2005); Meena Thiruvengadam, Scammers Drilling for Oil Investors, SAN ANTONIO
ExPmRss-NEws, Apr. 7, 2005, at 1E (discussing the press release).
25. See 31 Tex. Reg. 8671 (Oct. 20, 2006) (repealing 7 TEX. ADMIN. CODE § 133.36,
without comment); see also 31 Tex. Reg. 6440 (Aug. 18, 2006) (the proposal to repeal); 31
Tex. Reg. 8671 (Oct. 20, 2006) (adopting a new form); 31 Tex. Reg. 6440 (Aug. 18, 2006)
(the proposal to adopt the new form).
26. See 32 Tex. Reg. 2135 (Apr. 13, 2008) (amending 7 TEX. ADMIN. CODE § 101.5,
without comment); see also 32 Tex. Reg. 14 (Jan. 5, 2007) (the proposal to amend).
27. 32 Tex. Reg. 43 (Jan. 5, 2007) (amending 7 TEX. ADMIN. CODE § 111.2, without
comment); see also 31 Tex. Reg. 8603 (Oct. 20, 2006) (the proposal). The Texas Securities
Act exempts from registration securities listed on national exchanges. See TEX. REV. Civ.
STAT. ANN. art. 581-6(F) (Vernon Supp. 2007). The legislature amended the statute to




under the Internal Revenue Code.28 The company operated in bulk
transactions to obtain lower prices for its members. All members owned
ten shares of non-transferable, non-hypothecable Class A common stock,
purchased for $100 per share and sold back upon withdrawal for the same
price. The members additionally owned transferable Class B common
stock and preferred stock based on each member's warehouse purchases.
The company remitted the rebates as dividends on the preferred stock.
There was no market for any of the shares. In the conversion, the pre-
ferred stock would be converted to Class B shares, and then the Class B
and Class A shares would be exchanged for new Class B and Class A
shares. The resulting Delaware company would have Class C shares is-
sued to those members underinvested based on their warehouse
purchases. The Delaware company would additionally issue notes to
withdrawing members and pay rebates to alleviate cash flow problems.
The officers would receive no extra compensation for the conversion
work or for otherwise aiding the sale of the Delaware company's securi-
ties. The staff recommended no-action with respect to the registration of
the securities involved in the conversion and also the registration of the
officers as dealers. 29
The second no-action letter considered a common stock purchase plan
offering securities to employees and current shareholders. 30 The com-
pany, a New York corporation, was entirely owned by employees and
retired former employees. The company sold its shares to employees for
$20 per share, subject to a thirty-day buy-back option at the issue price.
Additionally, the company paid annual dividends of two dollars per
share.31 The officers would receive no extra compensation for aiding the
sale. The staff recommended no-action with respect to registration of the
shares to current employees, 32 retired former employees who were share-
holders, 33 and the one former employee. The staff further recommended
no-action with respect to registration of the officers as dealers. 34
The Board also took several enforcement actions against issuers. Is-
28. See Handy Hardware Wholesale, Inc., SEC No-Action Letter, 2006 WL 4783596,
at *1 (Dec. 15, 2006).
29. Cf TEX. REV. CiV. STAT. ANN. art. 581-5(G) (Vernon Supp. 2008) (exempting
from registration of securities those offers and sales made pursuant to mergers with share-
holder vote under state corporate statutes); see also id. art. 581-5 (those selling exempt
securities are not dealers).
30. See Graybar Elec. Co., SEC No-Action Letter, 2006 WL 4783595, at *1 (Oct. 25,
2006).
31. Without the dividend, this transaction becomes an interest free loan to the com-
pany, not exactly what the employees expected.
32. See TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 581-5(F) (Vernon Supp. 2008) (exempting
from registration of securities those offers and sales of securities made to employees pursu-
ant to employee benefit plans).
33. See id. art. 581-5(E) (exempting from registration of securities those offers and
sales made to current shareholders provided no commission is paid).




suer violations included failure to register their securities,35 some with
additional misrepresentations such as omitting convictions against the
principals and omitting financial data.36 Many involved the Board's iden-
tified threats to investors, namely oil and gas scams,
37 internet fraud,38
35. See Sun City Market, L.L.C., No. ENF-07-CDO-1636, 2007 WL 2361310, at *1-2
(Tex. St. Sec. Bd. Aug. 14, 2007) (agreed cease and desist order for selling shares of part-
nership to pay expenses of operation of partnership's gas station, convenience store, and
restaurant without registering the securities or selling agents); From Mex., L.L.C., No.
ENF-07-CDO-1632, 2007 WL 2161513, at *1-2 (Tex. St. Sec. Bd. July 20, 2007) (agreed
cease and desist order for selling membership units in a Nevada entity without registering
the securities or selling agents); Automated Vending Techs., Inc., No. ENF-07-CDO-1630,
2007 WL 1959120, at *1-2 (Tex. St. Sec. Bd. June 28, 2007) (agreed cease and desist order
for selling convertible debentures and common stock in a Delaware entity without register-
ing the securities or selling agents).
36. See, e.g., Nelsen, No. ENF-07-CDO-1631, 2007 WL 2050404, at *1-3 (Tex. St. Sec.
Bd. July 12, 2007) (agreed cease and desist order for selling pooled funds to be traded
overseas without registering the securities or selling agents, and failing to disclose a Cali-
fornia judgment for breach of contract against the principals); NCL Dev. L.L.C., No. ENF-
07-CDO-1628, 2007 WL 1366150, at *1-3 (Tex. St. Sec. Bd. May 2, 2007) (emergency cease
and desist order for selling convertible notes without registering the securities or selling
agents, and failing to disclose, among other omissions, defaults on previous guaranteed
promissory notes by the principals, judgments rendered against the principals for such de-
faults, evictions from business premises by the principals, the intended use of the monies,
the losses in the businesses previously operated by the principals, the indebtedness of the
principals, and forfeited charters of businesses previously operated by the principals, in-
cluding the charter of the issuer); Global Partners Capital, No. ENF-07-DCO-1626, 2007
WL 951805, at *1 (Tex. St. Sec. Bd. Mar. 20, 2007) (emergency cease and desist order for
selling treasury shares of an issuer engaged in oil and gas exploration without registering
the securities or selling agents and failing to disclose the risks associated with oil and gas
exploration or the financial data with respect to the issuer, not incorporated in Texas nor
authorized to do business in Texas).
37. See, e.g., Always Consulting, Inc., No. ENF-C7-CDO-1635, 2007 WL 2317197, at
*1-3 (Tex. St. Sec. Bd. Aug. 8, 2007) (order affirming emergency cease and desist order for
offering participation units in an Oklahoman oil and gas lease without disclosing numerous
guilty pleas of the principals for theft, counterfeiting, securities fraud, mail fraud, and as-
sault causing bodily injury from 1989 to 2004); Sundance Res., Inc., No. ENF-06-CDO-
1623, 2006 WL 3891516, at *1 (Tex. St. Sec. Bd. Dec. 22, 2006) (agreed cease and desist
order for selling working interests in oil and gas drilling projects without registering the
securities or selling agents); see also Always Consulting, Inc., No. ENF-06-CDO-1622, 2006
WL 3223649, at *1 (Tex. St. Sec. Bd. Oct. 25, 2006) (the emergency cease and desist order).
38. See Homeland Commc'ns Corp., No. ENF-06-CDO-1621, 2006 WL 2984784, at *1-
2 (Tex. St. Sec. Bd. Oct. 12, 2006) (emergency cease and desist order for offering common
stock and warrants over the Internet without registration of the securities or the selling
agents, and failing to disclose the financial statements of the issuer and securities sanctions
against the principal in Pennsylvania, Kansas, Illinois, Indiana, and Wyoming, and misrep-
resenting a forthcoming public offering in light of the same statement made two years
before); Home Shopping Latino, Inc., No. ENF-C6-CDO-1620, 2006 WL 2984782, a *1-2
(Tex. St. Sec. Bd. Oct. 11, 2006) (emergency cease and desist order for offering common
stock through a newspaper ad referring to a website, requiring investors to represent that
they learned about the offer through private channels rather than the newspaper ad, re-
quiring investors to represent that there is no public market while the promoters claim to
shortly take the company public, misrepresenting the chief financial officer as a member of
the California bar when he had been suspended from the practice twice and had agreed
with another to commit conspiracy to structure currency transactions, and misrepresenting
the chief executive officer as experienced in leading startup companies to NASDAQ list-
ings when he has been subject to a Missouri prosecution for engaging in illegal practices




IV. REGISTRATION OF MARKET OPERATORS
One common feature of state regulation of securities is the usual re-
quirement to register as a seller of securities before beginning sales in the
state, and to register as an investment advisor before rendering invest-
ment advice.40 Registration infractions generally surface when applying
or reapplying for registration.
A. DEALERS
During the Survey period, the Board prosecuted several enforcement
actions against dealers and selling agents. Dealer infractions included
failing to comply with a prior agreed undertaking with the Board, 41 fail-
ing upon inspection to give the Board access to certain required records,
failing to provide requested documents, failing to update filings,42 offer-
ing to engage in a restriction removing resale of securities through mis-
representations, 43 and allowing unregistered investment advisors to
access the dealer's customers' accounts even after learning about their
lack of registration.44
Selling agent violations included selling unregistered securities while
39. See Jaxtrece Exclusive Invs., L.L.C., No. ENF-07-CDO-1625, 2007 WL 631149, at
*1-2 (Tex. St. Sec. Bd. Feb. 26, 2007) (emergency cease and desist order for representing
principal guaranteed without disclosing information on what funds were reserved for the
guarantee, failing to disclose compensation fees and costs charged to investors in the offer-
ing materials, and misrepresenting professional degrees of principal).
40. See TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 581-13(D) (Vernon Supp. 2008) (stating the
requirements for registration).
41. See Dealer Registration of Advanced Planning Sec., Inc., No. IC07-CAF-20, 2007
WL 2464230, at *1-3 (Tex. St. Sec. Bd. Aug. 24, 2007) (administrative fine of $1000 for not
timely disclosing within ten days NASD arbitration complaint against dealer for breach of
fiduciary duty and deceptive practices against senior citizens discovered by Board eight
months later, but disclosing within one month churning and unsuitability parts of
complaint).
42. See Dealer Registration of One Fin. Sec., Ltd., No. IC07-REV-18, 2007 WL
2296408, at *2, *4-5 (Tex. St. Sec. Bd. Aug. 6, 2007) (revoking a dealer's and agent's license
for refusal to provide access and requested documents, and failing to amend registrations
to reflect applicant's subjection to a regulatory proceeding that could result in a finding of
regulatory and statutory violations); see also 7 TEx. ADMIN. CODE §§ 115.5(F) (Vernon
supp. 2008) (requiring Board access to records); id. 115.7(a), (e) (authorizing unannounced
inspections and requiring submission of records to Board within forty-eight hours).
43. See Phoenix Acquisitions, No. ENF-07-CDO-1633, 2007 WL 2317195, at *1-3 (Tex.
St. Sec. Bd. Aug. 6, 2007) (emergency cease and desist order for offering owners of shares
to remove legends in a sale regulated by the "U.S. Commission of Equities" under the
"International U.S. Securities Act").
44. See Dealer Registration of Ameritrade, Inc., No. IC07-CAF-03, 2007 WL 460605,
at *1-3 (Tex. St. Sec. Bd. Feb. 7, 2007) (disciplinary order for not prohibiting access to
broker's customers' accounts by unregistered investment advisors when advised by an in-
dependent contractor of the lack of registration, and not directing employees to investigate
the report of the independent contractor; imposing an administrative fine of $200,000 and




not registered as a dealer or agent, 45 making materially misleading state-
ments when offering securities, 46 being subject to an order issued within
the last five years by a state securities commissioner and the NASD,
47
engaging in the inequitable business practice of violating its principal's
supervisory procedures, 48 and failing to disclose a filed tax lien, a felony
conviction for driving while intoxicated, and a felony possession of co-
caine charge on the selling agent's filings.
49
B. INVESTMENT ADVISORS
The Board engaged in numerous enforcement actions against invest-
ment advisors during the Survey period. These actions involved render-
45. See Ginsberg, No. ENF-07-CDO-1629, 2007 WL 2762808, at *1-2 (Tex. St. Sec. Bd.
Sept. 18, 2007) (cease and desist order for selling the National Foundation of America Tax
Deductible Installment Plan for a fixed return with tax savings, and requiring a refund of
commissions to investors of $81,000); Heuermann, No. ENF-07-CDO-1637, 2007 WL
2361311, at *1-2 (Tex. St. Sec. Bd. Aug. 14, 2007) (cease and desist order for selling the
National Foundation of America Tax Deductible plans for a fixed return with tax savings
misrepresenting that the entity was tax-exempt organization); Marks, No. ENF-07-CDO-
1634, 2007 WL 2317196, at *1-2 (Tex. St. Sec. Bd. Aug. 6, 2007) (cease and desist order for
selling National Foundation of America Tax Deductible Installment Plan for a fixed return
with tax savings; see also Nat'l Found. of Am., No. ENF-07-CDO-1629, 2007 WL 1514023,
at *1 (Tex. St. Sec. Bd. May 18, 2007) (emergency cease and desist order that was modified
by the orders).
46. See Wilson, No. ENF-07-CDO-1639, 2007 WL 2762802, at *1 (Tex. St. Sec. Bd.
Sept. 17, 2007) (emergency cease and desist order for representing a guaranteed thirty
percent return, negating stated risks, and contradicting accredited investors requirements
to unaccredited investors seeking secure investments where offering documents described
risky shares of an issuer in a competitive business with no operational history); McAdams,
No. ENF-07-CDO-1638, 2007 WL 2689936, at *1 (Tex. Sec. Bd. Sept. 11, 2007) (cease and
desist order for representing principal guaranteed without disclosing information on what
funds were reserved for the guarantee and failing to disclose compensation fees and costs
charged to investors in the offering materials).
47. See Application for the Agent Registration of James Robert Brown, No. IC07-
SUS-11, 2007 WL 1663087, at *1 (Tex. St. Sec. Bd. May 25, 2007) (disciplinary order for
being suspended for twenty days and fined $5000 by the NASD for excessive mark-ups and
mark-downs on six transactions and denial of application as a salesperson by State of Illi-
nois; granting the application, reprimanding the selling agent, and suspending the selling
agent for 30 days); see also TEX. REV. CiV. STAT. ANN. art. 581-14(A)(9) (Vernon Supp.
2008) (authorizing the suspension for agents subject to an order of another securities regu-
latory body).
48. See Agent and Inv. Adviser Representative Registrations of John Hutchison
Arnette, No. 312-06-3016, 2007 WL 1202858, at *1.4, *6 (Tex. St. Sec. Bd. Apr. 19, 2007)
(default order for inequitable practices of selling securities labeled "universal lease agree-
ments" and "residence club memberships" on his own behalf and receiving commissions
therefore without obtaining prior permission of his principal investment advisor, failing to
update his registration to reflect the transactions, fraudulently representing to his principal
that he had not sold any securities, and fraudulently misrepresenting to the NASD the
amount of his commissions for the sales; revoking the investment advisor representative's
registration with an administrative fine of $100,000); see also TEX. REV. Civ. STAT. ANN.
art. 581-14(A)(3) (Vernon Supp. 2008) (authorizing the revocation of an agent's registra-
tion for engaging in inequitable practices or fraudulent business practices).
49. See Agent Registration of Christopher Anthony Corso, Sr., No. IC07-REV/FIN-
05, 2007 WL 852376, at *1-2, *5 (Tex. St. Sec. Bd. Mar. 5, 2007) (default order for failing to
disclose a filed tax lien in 2002, a 2004 felony conviction for driving while intoxicated, and a
2003 felony cocaine possession charge, within thirty days to the Board; revoking the regis-
tration with an administrative fine of $15,000).
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ing compensated service without registration,50 rendering compensated
service after registration lapsed and before renewal, 51 failing to establish
a written supervisory policy and thereby allowing an investment advisor
50. See Applications for Inv. Adviser Registration of Rock Ridge Capital, L.P., No.
ICC7-CAF-19, 2007 WL 2348529, at *1-2 (Tex. St. Sec. Bd. Aug. 14, 2007) (granting appli-
cation while reprimanding and ordering fines of $2500); Inv. Adviser Registration of First
Western Sec., Inc., No. IC07-CAF-17, 2007 WL 2161514, at *1-4 (Tex. St. Sec. Bd. July 23,
2007) (disciplinary order for failing to file amended forms, failing to supervise, and using
three unregistered investment advisors to give advice for compensation; reprimanding the
registered investment advisor with an administrative fine of $8000 and fines of $500, $4600
and $1900 for the unregistered investment advisors); Application for the Inv. Adviser Re-
gistration of Mark Anthony Miller, No. IC07-CAF-08, 2007 WL 1109070, at *1-2 (Tex. St.
Sec. Bd. Apr. 2, 2007) (disciplinary order for rendering compensated investment advice
without registration for six years, granting the registration and reprimanding the invest-
ment advisor with an administrative fine of $6000); Application for Inv. Adviser Represen-
tative Registration of Oscar Jackson III, No. IC06-CAF-51, 2006 WL 3338641, at *1-2 (Tex.
St. Sec. Bd. Nov. 10, 2006) (disciplinary order for rendering compensated investment ad-
vice without registration for three years; granting the registration and reprimanding the
investment advisor representative with an administrative fine of $6000); Inv. Adviser Rep-
resentative Registration of John Alan Braden, No. IC06-CAF-48, 2006 WL 2989280, at * 1-
2 (Tex. St. Sec. Bd. Oct. 11, 2006) (disciplinary order for rendering compensated invest-
ment advice without registration for one year and reprimanding the investor advisor repre-
sentative with an administrative fine of $1000); Application for Inv. Adviser
Representative Registration of William Anthony Richter, No. IC06-CAF-46, 2006 WL
2929570, at *1-2 (Tex. St. Sec. Bd. Oct. 6, 2006) (disciplinary order for rendering compen-
sated investment advice without registration for three years; granting the application and
reprimanding the investor advisor representative with an administrative fine of $3500).
51. See Budge, No. IC07-CDO-15, 2007 WL 1959119, at *1-2 (Tex. St. Sec. Bd. June
28, 2007) (cease and desist order until registered and administrative fine of $34,750 for
rendering compensated service as investment advisor representative, after registration
lapsed in 2002); Applications for the Inv. Adviser Registration of Sundial Capital Mgmt.,
L.P., No. IC06-CAF-49, 2006 WL 3051520, at *1-2 (Tex. St. Sec. Bd. Oct. 24, 2006) (discipli-
nary order for rendering compensated investment advice after registration lapsed in 2002;
granting registration and reprimanding with an administrative fine of $5000); Inv. Adviser
Registration of Mendelovitz & Urban Advisors, L.L.C., No. IC05-CAF-45, 2006 WL
2879776, at *1-2 (Tex. St. Sec. Bd. Oct. 5, 2006) (disciplinary order for rendering compen-
sated investment advice, after registration lapsed from 2003 to 2004; reprimanding with an
administrative fine of $2500); see also Inv. Adviser Registration of Mark Lee Westerman,
No. IC07-CEN-14, 2007 WL 1813672, at *1-2 (Tex. St. Sec. Bd. June 19, 2007) (disciplinary
order for rendering compensated service as investment advisor representative after failing
to transition to electronic registration in 2003; reprimanding the investment advisor repre-
sentative and granting the registration); Inv. Adviser Representative of Lynn Marie Miori,
No. IC07-CEN-12, 2007 WL 1727567, at *1-2 (Tex. St. Sec. Bd. June 11, 2007) (same, ex-
cept registration was granted in 2006); Inv. Adviser Representative Registration of Cad-
mus Kilgore Lawson II, No. IC07-CEN-04, 2007 WL 708557, at *1-2 (Tex. St. Sec. Bd. Mar.
5, 2007) (same); Application for Inv. Adviser Representative Registration of Fadi Boury,
No. IC06-CEN-55, 2006 WL 3907770, at *102 (Tex. St. Sec. Bd. Dec. 29, 2006) (same, ex-
cept also granting registration); Application for Inv. Adviser Representative Registration
of Larry Saunders, No. IC06-CEN-56, 2006 WL 3907771, at *1-2 (Tex. St. Sec. Bd. Dec. 29,
2006) (same); Application for Inv. Adviser Representative Registration of Stephen
Anthony Engro, No. IC06-CEN-54, 2006 WL 3891514, at *1-2 (Tex. St. Sec. Bd. Dec. 27,
2006) (same, but registration was previously granted); Application for Inv. Adviser Repre-
sentative Registration of Mark Diamond, No. IC06-CEN-53, 2006 WL 3891515, at *1-2(Tex. St. Sec. Bd. Dec. 27, 2006) (same); Inv. Adviser Representative Registration of Eu-
gen Kurt Schluter, No. IC06-CEN-52, 2006 WL 3907769, at *1-2 (Tex. St. Sec. Bd. Dec. 18,
2006) (same, except also granting registration); Application for Inv. Adviser Representa-
tive Registration of William Robert Allbright, No. I&C06-CEN-50, 2006 WL 3255437, at
*1-2 (Tex. St. Sec. Bd. Nov. 6, 2006) (same); Application for Inv. Adviser Representative
Registration of John William Byrd, Sr., No. IC06-CEN-47, 2006 WL 2929571, at *1-2 (Tex.
St. Sec. Bd. Oct. 6, 2006) (same).
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representative to copy client signatures on documents, 52 failing to follow
a written supervisory policy prohibiting the rendering of investment ad-
vice by unregistered investment advisor representatives for compensa-
tion,53 failing to disclose employment as an investment advisor
representative on a selling agent application,54 failing to disclose a sub-
business of an investment advisor representative on both the investment
advisor's filings and the investment advisor representative's filings,55 en-
gaging in fraudulent misrepresentation as a certified advisor to senior citi-
zens,56 and failing to amend filings to reflect indictments for felony
fraud.57
52. See Inv. Adviser Registration of Windward Partners L.L.C., No. IC07-SUS-16,
2007 WL 1952731, at *1-2 (Tex. St. Sec. Bd. June 29, 2007) (disciplinary order suspending
investment advisor for fifteen days and imposing administrative fine of $10,000 for letting
representative copy signature from documents and paste the signature on client documents
although no client was harmed); see also 7 TEx. ADMIN. CODE § 116.10 (2008) (requiring
investment advisors to maintain a written supervisory system to supervise the activities of
its representatives).
53. See Inv. Adviser Registration of Titan Wealth Mgmt., L.L.C., No. IC 07-CAF-13,
2007 WL 1813660, at *1-2 (Tex. St. Sec. Bd. June 19, 2007) (disciplinary order for failing to
follow written supervisory policy by using unregistered investment advisor representative;
reprimanding the investment advisor with an administrative fine of $9000); Dealer Regis-
tration of Butler Freeman Tally Fin. Group, L.L.C., No. IC07-CAF-10, 2007 WL 1459299,
at *1-2 (Tex. St. Sec. Bd. May 11, 2007) (disciplinary order for failing to follow written
supervisory policy by allowing an investment advisor representative also to render com-
pensated investment advisor services to another investment advisor without registration,
knowing of such investor advisory representative arrangement; reprimanding the dealer
with an administrative fine of $20,000).
54. See Inv. Adviser Registration of Crescent Advisor Group, Inc., No. IC07-CDO-07,
2007 WL 852378, at *1-3 (Tex. St. Sec. Bd. Mar. 13, 2007) (disciplinary order for rendering
compensated investment advice when not registered as an investment advisor representa-
tive, but registered as a selling agent of the investment advisor, and failing to denote the
advisor status on the selling agent filings, discovered on Board inspection; reprimanding
the investment advisor and the selling agent, and assessing an administrative fine of $1500
and a cease and desist order on the selling agent); see also Dealer and Inv. Adviser Regis-
trations of Dillon Gage Sec., Inc., No. IC07-CAF-06, 2007 WL 852377, at *1-3 (Tex. St. Sec.
Bd. Mar. 8, 2007) (same; reprimanding the investment advisor and the selling agent with an
administrative fine of $2500 and a cease and desist order on the selling agent).
55. See Inv. Adviser Registration of IAAS, Inc., No. IC07-CAF-02, 2007 WL 437327,
at *1-2 (Tex. St. Sec. Bd. Feb. 6, 2007) (disciplinary order for failure to disclose on the
investment advisor's filings and the investment advisor representative's filings the invest-
ment advisor representative's sole proprietorship in selling subscriptions to an analysis and
reporting service from 2004 through 2006).
56. See Inv. Adviser Representative Registrations of Richard Allen Alford, No. IC07-
CAF-01, 2007 WL 98087, at *1-3 (Tex. St. Sec. Bd. Jan. 9, 2007) (disciplinary order for
displaying certificates as senior advisors in the office and on business cards, customer
brochures, and website and targeting senior citizens by claiming it operated a foundation to
help senior citizens and specialization in financial planning for senior citizens, all at a time
when the certifications had lapsed; reprimanding with administrative fines of $12,500 each
on the two investment advisors, a cease and desist order, and requiring destruction of all
documents used with customers containing the fraudulent practice).
57. See Inv. Adviser Representative Registration of Ira Klein, No. IC06-REV/FIN-44,
2006 WL 2869562, at "1, *3-4 (Tex. St. Sec. Bd. Oct. 4, 2006) (default order for failing to
amend filing to reflect indictment by the federal grand jury for felony fraud, revoking re-




One of the major reasons legislatures passed securities acts was to facil-
itate investors' actions to recover their monies through a simplified fraud
action by eliminating the most difficult elements to prove in a common-
law fraud action, namely scienter and privity.
A. COURT DECISIONS UNDER THE TEXAS Acrs
One Texas Appeals Court narrowed the secondary parties that would
become liable for a perpetrator's fraud by finding that merely preparing
the transactional documents did not satisfy the requisite scienter for sec-
ondary party liability.58 Another Texas Appeals Court determined that
the Board's standard certifications of process were insufficient to support
a default judgment. 59
1. Aider and Abetter Liability
Injured investors continue to hunt for lucrative sources of recovery
when investments sour. One such source lies in third parties who may
have enabled the alleged perpetrator of fraud to sell the securities. But
to hold these individuals liable for the investment loss under the TSA
requires more than just the enablement. Injured investors must prove
sufficient scienter by the alleged aider and abetter to recover.60 This
year's case involves a lawyer, and his law firm through respondeat supe-
rior principles. Under what circumstances does a lawyer preparing the
transactional documents run the risk of liability to the investors when the
promoter client may have engaged in securities fraud?
In Kastner v. Jenkens & Gilchrist, P.C.,61 a limited partner sought re-
covery against the attorney that represented the promoter in establishing
a limited partnership to purchase and operate an apartment complex.
According to the Dallas Court of Appeals, the lawyer merely prepared
the transactional documents for a client who may or may not have been
involved in securities fraud. The lawyer formed the limited partnership
and the corporate general partner based upon information supplied by
the promoter. The lawyer represented the limited partnership, the gen-
eral partner, and the promoter at the closing of the apartment complex.
The lawyer's representation ceased after the closing. The partnership
later fell into financial difficulties and filed for bankruptcy. The suing
limited partner brought this action against a number of parties, including
the promoter, the general partner, the company managing the apartment
complex, and the lawyer and his law firm. The suit was based on several
grounds, one being violation of the TSA. Due to non-suits, settlements,
and other motions for summary judgment, the lawsuit was reduced to the
58. 231 S.W.3d 571 (Tex. App.-Dallas, 2007, no pet.).
59. 218 S.W.3d 126, 126 (Tex. App. Ct.--Houston [14th Dist.] 2007, pet. denied).
60. Sterlingtrust Co. v. Adderly, 168 S.W.3d 835, 842 (Tex. 2005).
61. 231 S.W.3d 571 (Tex. App.-Dallas 2007, no pet.).
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actions against the lawyer and his firm. The trial court granted a sum-
mary judgment for the lawyer and his firm. The limited partner appealed.
The securities law claim involved a misrepresentation. If successful,
the suing limited partner would recover its contributions with interest.
62
The alleged securities misrepresentation involved the calculation of the
partnership interests. The partnership agreement required the limited
partners to contribute cash. The lawyer's cover letter submitted to the
limited partners indicated that the final partnership interests would be
determined at the closing based on the aggregate contributions of the
partners. Unfortunately, some limited partners contributed non-cash
items, rather than cash, and so the partnership percentages recorded in
the partnership agreement were incorrect. Moreover, due to the lack of
sufficient cash contribution at closing, the seller of the apartment com-
plex had to finance a portion of the purchase of the apartment complex.
Liability for an aider and abetter under the TSA requires liability of the
primary perpetrator of the fraud, plus material aid and an "intent to
deceive or defraud or reckless disregard for the truth or the law" by the
alleged aider and abetter.63 While the summary judgment motion evi-
dence might raise fact issues with respect to the liability of the primary
perpetrator-the promoter-the investor failed to offer any evidence of
scienter by the lawyer. The evidence showed that the lawyer believed the
calculated partnership interests to be accurate, and that the shortfall of
cash at the closing resulted from inaccurately estimating the funds needed
for the purchase rather than the failure to bring in sufficient cash sub-
scriptions. Consequently, the appellate court affirmed. 64
2. Substitute Service
For out-of-state issuers, dealers, and investment advisors, the TSA pro-
vides a method of serving substitute process on the Board.65 Injured in-
vestors who avail themselves to this method of service hope that such
service would support a subsequent default judgment against the perpe-
trator. After all, the semi-analogous substitute service provision for the
Secretary of State under the Texas Business Corporation Act 66 does sup-
port a later default judgment if the Secretary of State provides a certifi-
cate satisfying certain conditions imposed by the Texas Supreme Court.
67
62. See TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 581-33(A)(2), (D) (Vernon Supp. 2008) (seller
liability for misrepresentation or omission; buyer's right to rescission).
63. See id. art. 581-33(F)(2) (Vernon Supp. 2008).
64. Kastner, 231 S.W.3d at 587.
65. See id. art. 581-8 (Vernon Supp. 2008) (when commissioner is served with process
as agent for dealer, commissioner must forward the process to the dealer's last known
address).
66. The corporate law provision covers the situation when the agent for process can-
not be located or was not appointed. See TEX. Bus. CORP. Acr ANN. art. 2.11 (Vernon
Supp. 2008); see also TEX. Bus. ORGS. CODE ANN. § 5.251 (Vernon 2008) (not appointed).
67. See Capitol Brick, Inc., v. Fleming Mfg. Co., 722 S.W.2d 399, 401 (Tex. 1986) (pro-
vided the Secretary of State's certificate shows it received process as agent of the defen-
dant and forwarded the service as required by the statute).
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This year, a Texas appellate court, on a case of first impression, concluded
that the Texas Securities Commissioner's procedures for substitute pro-
cess did not satisfy the Texas Supreme Court's requirements for default
judgment. Consequently, out-of-state dealers might avoid fraud liability
by dodging personal service. In Harvestons Securities, Inc. v. Narnia In-
vestments, Ltd.,68 the injured investor served the petition on the Texas
Securities Commissioner, who sent the petition to the dealer by both reg-
ular mail and certified mail. 69 The dealer did not answer the lawsuit. Af-
ter severing the action from the other defendants, the injured investor
obtained a default judgment against the dealer. The dealer brought the
current action to set aside the default judgment alleging invalid service of
process. In support of its default judgment, the injured investor had sub-
mitted two certificates from the Texas Securities Commissioner. In both
certificates, the Texas Securities Commissioner certified that the attached
records were true copies of a record filed with the Texas Securities Com-
missioner.70 One record was the letter forwarding the petition to the
dealer, addressed to the dealer with the cause number and court, stating
"[t]he Securities Commissioner has received process in the above-refer-
enced lawsuit. Since [dealer] is named as a defendant, we are forwarding
process to you."'7 1 The second record was the dealer's power of attorney
appointing the Securities Commissioner as agent for service of process.
The trial court upheld the default judgment, but the Houston Court of
Appeals reversed and remanded.
72
The majority reasoned that the Texas Supreme Court has spelled out
two requirements before a government official's certificate could support
a default judgment. First, the statute must require courts to accept the
certificate as sufficient evidence, although rebuttable, of the facts as
stated. Comparing the Texas Business Corporation Act provision with
the Texas Securities Act provision, the majority concluded the latter stat-
ute was deficient of this requirement.73 The corporate provision provides
68. 218 S.W.3d 126, 126 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 2007, pet. denied).
69. This procedure went beyond that required by the TSA. At the time of the lawsuit,
the TSA had no requirement to forward the process to the dealer. See TEX. REV. CIv.
STAT. ANN. art. 581-8 (Vernon Supp. 1999) (only forward for issuer). The current version
does not require certified mail. See TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 581-8 (Vernon Supp.
2008).
70. The standard language of the Texas Securities Commissioner was:
I, , Securities Commissioner of the State of Texas, do hereby certify
that I have caused to be made a careful examination of the records of the
State Securities Board, which records are kept under my supervision and
control under the provision of [the Texas Securities Act] and from such ex-
amination, I do further certify that the attached [number of attached pages]
pages constitute a true and correct record of information filed with the Se-
curities Commissioner.
Harvestons Sec., 218 S.W.3d at 131.
71. See id. at 132.
72. See id. at 135.
73. Compare TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 9.05 (Vernon 2003 & Supp. 2008) ("All
certificates issued by the Secretary of State in accordance with the provisions of this Act,
and all copies of documents filed in his office in accordance with the provisions of this Act,
when certified by him, shall be taken and received in all courts, public offices, and official
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that the Secretary of State's certificate is prima facie evidence of the facts
therein stated, but the securities provision merely states the certificate is
some evidence, provided the original constituted some evidence. How-
ever, the minority argued that this statutory distinction lacked real
meaning.
The second requirement related to the language of the certificate. The
certificate must state that the Secretary of State received the citation as
an agent of the respective defendant and that the Secretary of State for-
warded the citation and petition to the correct address. The Secretary of
State's certificates for substituted process generally so state.74 The Secur-
ities Commissioner's certificates in this case, however, merely certified
that the document was a true and correct record of what was on file with
the Securities Commissioner. 75 Since these certificates did not say
whether the Commissioner was served with citation or petition in the
case, or that the documents accurately reflected the actions or events
stated, the majority found that the certificates did not support the defaultjudgment. 76 On the other hand, the minority felt that the forwarding let-
ters, subject to one of the Securities Commissioner's certificates, satisfied
the requirement even though they failed to indicate that the Commis-
sioner received the petition as agent for that defendant (there were sev-
eral), failed to include a copy of the petition (or identify which one), and
contained no information with respect to the receipt (or attempted re-
ceipt) of the letter by the defendant. 77
bodies as prima facie evidence of the facts therein stated .. ") and TEX. Bus. ORGS. CODE
ANN. § 4.005 (Vernon Supp. 2008) ("A court, public office, or official body shall accept a
certificate issued as provided by this code by the secretary of state or a copy of a filing
instrument accepted by the secretary of state for filing as provided by this code that is
certified by the secretary of state as prima facie evidence of the facts stated in the certifi-
cate or instrument.") with TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 581-30 (Vernon Supp. 2008)("Copies of all papers, instruments, or documents filed in the office of the Commissioner,
certified by the Commissioner, shall be admitted to be read in evidence in all courts of law
and elsewhere in this state in all cases where the original would be admitted in
evidence ...").
74. See InsureSuite, Inc. v. MJS Mktg., L.P., No. 03-05-00822-CV, 2006 WL 2080684,
at *2-4 (Tex. App.-Austin July 26, 2006) (the certificate dated April 4, 2005, states "(1)
the citation and MJS's original petition were received by his office on March 17, 2005; (2)
his office forwarded the citation and the petition to InsureSuite on March 22, 2005, by
certified mail, return receipt requested to 'InsureSuite Inc,' 600 N Brand Blvd, Glendale,
CA 91203-4207; and (3) the Secretary of State received the return receipt, bearing the
signature of addressee's (InsureSuite's) agent on March 28, 2005.).
75. The certificates stated
I, [ ] Securities Commissioner of the State of Texas, do hereby certify that I
have caused to be made a careful examination of the records of the State
Securities Board, which records are kept under my supervision and control
under the provisions of [the Texas Securities Act] and from such examina-
tion, I do further certify that the attached [number of attached pages] consti-
tute a true and correct record of information filed with the Securities
Commissioner.
Harvestons Sec., 218 S.W.3d at 131.
76. See id. at 134.
77. The cover letter merely stated: "[t]he Securities Commissioner has received pro-
cess in the above-referenced lawsuit. Since Harveston Securities, Inc. [sic] is named as a
defendant, we are forwarding process to you." See id. at 132.
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B. COURT DECISIONS UNDER THE FEDERAL ACTS
The fraud provisions of the TSA are modeled on the federal statutes.
78
As a result, Texas courts interpreting the TSA frequently look to federal
decisions. Congress has designed the federal securities laws to rely on
SEC enforcement against the perpetrators of fraud, including aiders and
abetters, rather than private class actions so as not to siphon off some of
the investors' recovery to litigious plaintiff's lawyers.
The Fifth Circuit continued the federal effort to eliminate frivolous pe-
titions alleging securities fraud within private class actions. One investor
failed to allege sufficient facts to infer the scienter required under the
Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995 ("PLSRA"). Those
facts need some connection to the misstatements or omissions.79 Two
other investors failed to obtain class certification due to the inappropri-
ateness of the fraud-on-the-market theory to satisfy the reliance require-
ment of a securities fraud situation.80 The Fifth Circuit imposed
burdensome requirements for class certification in such cases after con-
sidering some merits at the class certification stage of the lawsuit. It also
required a negative market reaction to the disclosure of corrective an-
nouncements before fraud-on-the-market theory could be employed.
81
The United States Supreme Court has confirmed their efforts.
82
1. Scienter under the PSLRA
Congress drafted the PSLRA with the intent of reducing the number of
private actions brought under the antifraud provisions of the federal se-
curities laws. Before the PLSRA, some investors had used such antifraud
actions to extort settlements in lieu of substantial litigation costs from
issuers and individuals whose conduct actually conformed to the federal
securities laws. The PSLRA accomplishes its intended goal through
heightened pleading requirements coupled with a bar to discovery during
motions to dismiss a complaint for pleading errors.83 In particular, the
complaint must state the facts "giving rise to a strong inference" that the
perpetrator of the fraud possessed the requisite intent or scienter. 84 Con-
gress did not, however, define what it meant by a "strong inference." Al-
though the Supreme Court recently provided some guidance as to the
78. See TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 581-33 cmt. to 1977 Amendment (Vernon
Supp. 2008).
79. Cent. Laborers' Pension Fund v. Integrated Elec. Servs., Inc., No. Civ. A. 4:04-CV-
3342, 2006 WL 54021, at *1-5 (S.D. Tex. Jan. 10, 2006), affd, 497 F.3d 546 (5th Cir. 2007).
80. Regents of Univ. of Cal. v. Credit Suisse First Boston (USA), Inc., 482 F.3d 372
(5th Cir. 2007); Oscar Private Equity Invs. v. Allegiance Telecom, Inc., 487 F.3d 261 (5th
Cir. 2007).
81. 487 F.3d. at 262.
82. See Regents, 482 F.3d 372, 387-90 (adopting the position of the Eighth Circuit that
was subsequently affirmed by the Supreme Court, In re Charter Communications, Inc.
Securities Litigation, 443 F.3d 987 (8th Cir. 2006), affd sub. nom., Stonebridge Inv. Part-
ners, LLC v. Scientific-Atlanta, Inc., 128 S. Ct. 761 (2008)).
83. See 15 U.S.C.A. § 78u-4(b)(3)(B)(3) (West 1997).
84. See 15 U.S.C.A. § 78u-4(b)(2) (West 1997).
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meaning,85 the Fifth Circuit continues to confront pleadings that lack
even minimal inferences. In Central Laborers' Pension Fund v. Integrated
Electrical Services, Inc.,86 the issuer had published a series of stock tout-
ing documents to increase the issuer's visibility and make it more attrac-
tive to investors.87 These documents routinely omitted information
unfavorable to the issuer. Over the next year, the issuer's stock rose, only
to decline when the independent auditors reported weakness in the is-
suer's internal controls that resulted in erroneous accounting practices in
the issuer's subsidiaries, necessitating restatements. 88 The district court
dismissed the lawsuit. The Fifth Circuit affirmed. 89 The investor's factual
allegations in support of the scienter requirement consisted of GAAP vi-
olations, confidential sources reporting pervasive knowledge of account-
ing problems, insider trading, and false Sarbanes-Oxley certifications.
The Fifth Circuit found that much of the investor's scienter allegations
lacked any connection with the alleged fraud. With respect to the GAAP
violations, the pleadings lacked any factual allegations as to what was
known, who knew it, when that person knew it, or how that knowledge
related to any of the alleged misstatements.90 For the confidential
85. When certain facts became susceptible to more than one inference, the circuits
differed on whether the court should consider only the investor's inference or require the
most compelling inference. The Sixth Circuit had the stiffest position and sought to judge
the complaint on the basis of the most "plausible" inference. See Helwig v. Vencor, Inc.,
251 F.3d 540, 553 (6th Cir. 2001). The First, Fourth, and Ninth Circuits required the inves-
tor's inference to be more convincing than the other inferences. See, e.g., Brown v. Credit
Suisse First Boston L.L.C., 431 F.3d 36, 49 (1st Cir. 2005), vacated Tellabs, Inc. v. MakOr
Issues & Rights, Ltd, 127 S. Ct. 2499 (2007) (complaint does not pass where "there are
legitimate explanations for the behavior that are equally convincing"); Ottmann v. Hanger
Orthopedic Group, Inc., 353 F.3d 338, 349 (4th Cir. 2003) (complaint does not pass where
facts are "more consistent with negligence than with recklessness or intent"); Gompper v.
VISX, Inc., 298 F.3d 893, 897 (9th Cir. 2002) (must consider all inferences and conclude on
balance). The Tenth Circuit evaluated the investor's inference in the context of other in-
ferences, but refuses to weigh them. See Pirraglia v. Novell, Inc., 339 F.3d 1182, 1188 (10th
Cir. 2003). The Seventh Circuit had the weakest position and would only consider the
investor's inference. See Makor Issues & Rights, Ltd. v. Tellabs, Inc., 437 F.3d 588, 602
(7th Cir. 2006), vacated 127 S. Ct. 2499 (2007).
The Supreme Court resolved this difference by specifying a middle ground. Tellabs, Inc.
v. Makor Issues & Rights, Ltd., 127 S. Ct. 2499, 2510 (2007). The court must consider
opposing inferences and, for the complaint to satisfy the requirement, the inference of
scienter must be "at least as compelling as any opposing inference one could draw from the
facts alleged." See id.
86. 497 F.3d 546 (5th Cir. 2007). The Fifth Circuit's opinion lacks sufficient detail to
comprehend its conclusions. For a more complete rendition of the factual situation, see In
re Integrated Elec. Servs., Inc., No. Civ. A. 4:04-CV-3342, 2006 WL 54021, at *1-5 (S.D.
Tex. Jan. 10, 2006), affd, 497 F.3d 546 (5th Cir. 2007); Brief of Appellees at 12, Central
Laborers' Pension Fund v. Integrated Elec. Servs., Inc., No. 06-20135 (5th Cir. Oct. 15,
2006); Brief of Appellant at 20, Central Laborers' Pension Fund v. Integrated Elec. Servs.,
Inc., No. 06-20135 (5th Cir. Sept. 5, 2006).
87. See Central Laborers' Pension Fund, 2006 WL 54021, at *1, *34.
88. See id. at *1.
89. See 497 F.3d at 556. The Fifth Circuit also affirmed the district court's refusal to
allow amendments to the petition since the proposed amendments would not cure the de-
fects in the petition outlined by the Fifth Circuit. See id.
90. See id. at 552 ("GAAP violations, without more, do not establish scienter."); see
Brief of Appellees at 32, Central Laborers' Pension Fund v. Integrated Elec. Servs., Inc.,
No. 06-20135, 497 F.3d 546 (5th Cir. Oct. 15, 2006); see also Abrams v. Baker Hughes, Inc.,
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sources, the pleadings failed to allege facts concerning the witnesses' job
descriptions, responsibilities, and dates of employment so the Fifth Cir-
cuit could not discern whether the witnesses' statements amounted to
speculative gossip or concrete knowledge of their statements' veracity. 91
The sale of the issuer's stock by the chief executive officer, being less than
four percent of his holdings, was too negligible to support an inference of
scienter. But the sale of most of the issuer's stock held by the former
chief financial officer during the period prior to his resignation did sup-
port an inference of scienter. The Sarbanes-Oxley certifications, signed
by the chief financial officer and former chief financial officer, attesting to
the adequacy of the issuer's internal controls in the absence of factual
allegations that the certifying officers participated in any of the issues that
lead to the restatement or to the identification of weaknesses in the con-
trols, did not support an inference of scienter.
92
2. Reliance by the Fraud-on-the-Market Theory
One of the elements of a securities fraud action under Rule 10b-5 is
reliance.93 To maintain a commonality of reliance among all members of
a class, class action investors frequently invoke presumptions to establish
the reliance element of the cause of action. The Affiliated Ute doctrine
provides that a court may presume reliance in a Rule 10b-5 action based
primarily on a failure to disclose, while the fraud-on-the-market theory
presumes reliance where the securities trade in an efficient market since
the market price reflects all material, public information and the investor
is presumed to rely on the integrity of the market place.94 In two recent
opinions, the Fifth Circuit joined those circuit courts by placing stringent
requirements invoking these presumptions when certifying a class. The
earlier opinion required class action investors seeking liability of aiders
and abetters of the fraud committed by the issuer to provide evidence of
a duty to disclose, or the making of a public and material misrepresenta-
292 F.3d 424, 432 (5th Cir. 2002) (publication of inaccurate accounting figures without facts
showing the misstaters knew of the inaccuracies does not establish scienter).
91. Central Laborers' Pension Fund, 497 F.3d at 552 (the "confidential source state-
ments lack sufficient detail to credit them as bases for a strong inference of scienter");
Brief of Appellees at 36, Central Laborers' Pension Fund v. Integrated Elec. Servs., Inc.,
497 F.3d 546, No. 06-20135 (5th Cir. Oct. 15, 2006); see also Barrie v. Intervoice-Brite, Inc.,
397 F.3d 249, 264, modified, 409 F.3d 653 (5th Cir. 2005).
92. Central Laborers' Pension Fund, 497 F.3d at 555 (the petition did "not clearly ex-
plain the link between these statements about the internal controls and the actual account-
ing and reporting problems that arose").
93. See Dura Pharms., Inc. v. Broudo, 544 U.S. 336, 341-42 (2005) (setting out the
elements of the cause of action as: (1) a material misrepresentation (or omission) .... (2)
scienter,. . . (3) a connection with the purchase or sale of a security,... (4) reliance, ... (5)
economic loss .... (6) and loss causation).
94. See, e.g., Affiliated Ute Citizens v. United States, 406 U.S. 128, 152-54 (1972) (pre-
sumptive reliance for improper omissions); Basic Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224, 241-47,
250 (1988) (adopting fraud-on-the market theory of reliance under certain circumstances).
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tion by the aider and abetter.95 The later opinion required evidence of
"loss causation," which is one of the other elements of the cause of ac-
tion, to invoke the fraud-on-the-market presumption of reliance. 96
The earlier opinion, Regents of the University of California v. Credit
Suisse First Boston (USA), Inc.,97 dealt with several financial institutions
purchasing assets of an issuer, while agreeing also to sell the assets back
to the issuer later for a premium. This enabled the issuer to misstate its
financial condition by recording these transactions as sales rather than
loans. According to the class action investors, these financial institutions
knew they were aiding and abetting the insurer's long-term scheme to
defraud the investors. Since the Supreme Court has foreclosed secondary
liability against aiders and abetters through the more usual cause of ac-
tion under Rule 10b-5(b) proscribing misrepresentations, 98 the class ac-
tion investors sought primary liability for these aiders and abetters under
(1) Rule 10b-5(a), which forbids deceptive devices, schemes, and artifices;
and (2) Rule 10b-5(c), which prohibited deceptive acts, practices, and
courses of business. The district court adopted the SEC's proposed test
for defining a deceptive act, namely "a transaction whose principal pur-
pose and effect is to create a false appearance of revenues." 99 Then the
district court concluded that the class action investors were entitled to a
presumption of reliance under the Affiliated Ute doctrine and the fraud-
on-the-market theory, and certified the class.100
Disposing of two procedural issues, 01 the Fifth Circuit determined that
95. Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Credit Suisse First Boston (USA), Inc., 482 F.3d
372 (5th Cir. 2007), cert. denied, 128 S. Ct. 1120 (U.S. Jan. 22, 2008) (Smith, J., majority
opinion).
96. Oscar Private Equity Invs. v. Allegiance Telecom, Inc., 487 F.3d 261 (5th Cir. 2007)(Higginbotham, J.). Judge Higginbotham served as a visiting professor in 2007, and is so
serving in 2008, at the same institution as the author.
97. 482 F.3d at 372.
98. See Central Bank, N.A. v. First Interstate Bank, N.A., 511 U.S. 164, 183-85 (1994).99. See Enron Corp. Sec., Derivative & "ERISA" Litig., 236 F.R.D. 313, 316; see also
Enron Corp. Sec., Derivative & "ERISA" Litig., 439 F. Supp. 2d 692, 714, 714-15 n.27(S.D. Tex. 2006) (spelling out the test contained in an amicus curiae brief in another case).
The Supreme Court recently rejected this definition of scheme liability. See Stoneridge
Inv. Partners, LLC v. Scientific-Atlanta, Inc., 128 S. Ct. 761, 770 (2008) (mentioning Enron
Corp.). This theory is based on the idea that, in an efficient market, investors not only rely
on statements but also upon the transactions those statements reflect. If adopted it would
reach the whole marketplace in which the issuer does business. There is no authority for
this rule since it is not in connection with a purchase or sale of a security. It seeks to
impose securities fraud liability beyond the securities markets, the realm of financing a
business, to purchase and supply contracts, the realm of ordinary business operations.
100. See Enron Corp. Sec., Derivative & "ERISA" Litig., 236 F.R.D. 313, 317 ("under
Affiliated Ute and/or the fraud-on-the-market theory").
101. The Fifth Circuit determined that the interlocutory appeal of the class certification
was proper since FED. R. Civ. P. 23(f) permits leave to appeal when certification may force
a defendant to settle rather than incur the costs of defending the class action. The "settle-
ment pressure appears to be particularly acute" for these financial institutions since the
class action investors seek to hold them "liable for nearly the entirety of securities losses
stemming from the Enron collapse." See 482 F.3d at 379.
The Fifth Circuit also determined that, although FED. R. Civ. P. 23(f) limits the appeal
to issues needed for class certification, the appellate court could consider an issue that
relates to both the class certification and the merits. See id. at 380-81.
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the district court erred in presuming reliance and reversed, decertified the
class, and remanded. 10 2 The court held that the Affiliated Ute doctrine
only applies to cases involving non-disclosure where the perpetrator
owed a duty of disclosure to the class action investors. The financial insti-
tutions were not fiduciaries of the class action investors and were not
otherwise obligated to them, and so owed no duties to the class action
investors. The duty not to break the law, as the district court reasoned,
10 3
is insufficient to raise the Affiliated Ute presumption. Since investors can-
not expect financial institutions to provide them with information, the
investors cannot be deemed to have relied on their candor. With respect
to the fraud-on-the-market presumption, the district court used an overly
broad interpretation of the definitions of a deceptive act. The Fifth Cir-
cuit noted that the Supreme Court had foreclosed secondary liability for
secondary actors, but not primary liability for deceptive acts. The various
circuit courts had developed two standards to determine the deceptive
acts leading to primary liability of secondary actors. The Ninth Circuit
follows the SEC's broad approach and attaches primary liability to secon-
dary actors if they engage in a transaction whose principal purpose and
effect is to create the false appearance of revenue.104 The district court
followed this approach. In contrast, the Eighth Circuit limited the decep-
tive act giving rise to primary liability of secondary actors to making a
fraudulent statement or directly engaging in manipulative securities trad-
ing practices. 10 5 The United States Supreme Court has subsequently con-
firmed the Eighth Circuit's approach1 6 The Fifth Circuit in turn
adopted the Eighth Circuit's approach. 10 7 The Supreme Court had deter-
mined that liability for fraudulent nondisclosure requires a duty to
speak,' 08 and for fraudulent misrepresentation there must be a practice,
"such as wash sales, matched orders, or rigged prices, that are intended to
102. See id. at 394.
103. See Enron Corp. Sec., Derivative & "ERISA" Litig., No. H-01-3624, 2006 WL
4381143, at *27 (S.D. Tex. June 5, 2006).
104. See Simpson v. AOL Time Warner, Inc., 452 F.3d 1040, 1048 (9th Cir. 2006), va-
cated sub. nom., Avis Budget Group, Inc. v. Cal. State Teachers' Ret. Sys., 128 S. Ct. 1119(2008).
105. See In re Charter Commc'ns, Inc., Sec. Litig., 443 F.3d 987, 992 (8th Cir. 2006),
affd sub. nom. Stonebridge Inv. Partners, LLC v. Scientific-Atlanta, Inc., 128 S. Ct. 761
(2008). The scheme in Charter Communications was similar to the Enron Corp. scheme.
See Stonebridge Inv. Partners, LLC v. Scientific-Atlanta, Inc., 128 S. Ct. 761, 766 (2008).
The issuer overpaid for cable boxes (capitalized thus reducing reportable expenses for the
reporting period) and received the overpayment refund as advertising (revenue). Neither
the Affiliated Ute nor the fraud-on-the-market presumptions apply. There is no duty to
disclose and the deceptive acts were not communicated to the public. No member of the
investing public had knowledge of the deceptive acts of the secondary actors during the
relevant times. The investors can not show reliance on any of the perpetrators' acts "ex-
cept in an indirect chain the [Supreme Court] find[s] too remote for liability." See id. at
769.
106. Stoneridge Inv. Partners, LLC v. Scientific-Atlanta, Inc., 128 S. Ct. 761 (2008).
107. See 482 F.3d at 387-90 (adopting the Eighth Circuit's position rather than the
Ninth Circuit's position).
108. See Chiarella v. United States, 445 U.S. 222, 230-31 (1980).
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mislead investors by artificially affecting market activity." 10 9 In the pre-
sent situation, the financial institutions lacked any duties to the class ac-
tion investors and did not engage in activity affecting market activity.
The market was not entitled to rely on the financial institutions conduct
and so the fraud-on-the-market presumption was inapplicable.' 10
Oscar Private Equity Investments v. Allegiance Telecom, Inc.'11 in-
volved alleged misrepresentations of an issuer providing telephone ser-
vice and equipment that overstated the issuer's line-installation count by
twelve percent during the first, second, and third quarters, resulting in a
fourth quarter adjustment by the auditors. Share prices for the telecom
industry declined significantly during the year, with the issuer's share
price plunging ninety percent. After each of the first three quarterly an-
nouncements, the share price would rise nine percent to twenty-nine per-
cent, but then resume declining. On the fourth quarter's announcement,
the share price fell twenty-eight percent the next trading day. The class
action investors sued the bankrupt issuer, the chief executive officer, and
the vice president of sales. The district court certified the class relying on
the fraud-on-the-market presumption for class commonality of reliance.
The issuer's officers filed an interlocutory appeal.
The Fifth Circuit vacated the certification and remanded.1 1 2 The Fifth
Circuit had to consider whether class action investors had to prove their
entitlement to the fraud-on-the market presumption at the class certifica-
tion stage. 11 3 The presumption requires proof of (1) the loss causation
prerequisite, that is that the corrective statement actually moved the mar-
ket down, and (2) the sufficiency of the evidence to establish the prereq-
uisite. The Fifth Circuit had previously required examination of evidence
for the efficient market prerequisite at the class certification stage for use
109. See Santa Fe Indus., Inc. v. Green, 430 U.S. 462, 476 (1977).
110. The concurring opinion would take a radically different approach. See 482 F.3d at
394 (Dennis, J., concurring). The concurring justice would accept the broad definition of
"deceptive act" of the Ninth Circuit since the court should interpret statutes broadly to
effectuate their remedial purposes. But the district court defined the class too broadly.
Primary liability for securities fraud requires that the investor be harmed by the perpetra-
tor's acts. Consequently, a financial institution could not be liable to those investors that
purchased the issuer's stock (the price of which may have already been inflated by the
fraudulent acts of other defendants) before that financial institution's transactions. The
concurring justice would remand to consider whether class certification was appropriate in
light of his clarification of the applicable legal standard.
Imposing requirements on class action investors before they could use the reliance pre-
sumptions also disturbed the concurring justice. Such actions reversed the burden of proof
required by the reliance presumption from the defendants to the plaintiffs. This was con-
trary to the Supreme Court's creation of the fraud-on-the-market presumption and early
Fifth Circuit precedent. See Basic Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224, 246-48 (1988); Fine v.
Am. Solar King Corp., 919 F.2d 290, 299 (5th Cir. 1990). The concurring justice traced this
development from an opinion in which the plaintiff's complaint contained the rebutting
material on the lack of a price impact, see Nathenson v. Zonagen Inc., 267 F.3d 400, 414,
417-18 (5th Cir. 2001), to an opinion imposing a requirement on the plaintiff to show an
impact on the stock price. See Greenberg v. Crossroads Sys., Inc., 364 F.3d 657, 663, 665
(5th Cir. 2004).
111. 487 F.3d. 261 (5th Cir. 2007).
112. See id. at 271.
113. See Greenberg v. Crossroads Sys., Inc. 364 F.3d 657, 663, 665-66 (5th Cir. 2004).
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of the fraud-on-the-market presumptions. 1 4 It also previously required
proof of the loss causation prerequisite at the summary judgment stage
for use of the fraud-on-the-market presumption for class actions.' 15 The
Fifth Circuit decided here only to impose the loss causation prerequisite
at the class certification stage to permit use of the fraud-on-the-market
presumption in class action suits. The court found that this was appropri-
ate, in light of the 2003 amendments to the class action rule authorizing
limited merit inquiry on those aspects necessary to class certification,
1 16
and the purpose of the PSLRA to eliminate the previous trend to avoid
litigation costs to settling. Specifically, the Fifth Circuit rejected the class
action investors' assertion that materiality satisfied the loss causation pre-
requisite since (1) material information of a particular type is sometimes
ignored by analysts and market makers thereby not moving the share
price, and (2) insider trading can move the share price before disclosure
of the material information likewise not moving the market. Further, the
Fifth Circuit determined that the loss causation prerequisite must be es-
tablished by a preponderance of all admissible evidence.1 17 These class
action investors failed this requirement since they presented only analyst
commentary." 8 The problem for the class action investors lied in the
negative statements made at the time of the corrective disclosure. The
Fifth Circuit requires that the class action investors show that it is more
probable than not that it was the corrective statement, "and not other
unrelated negative statements, that caused a significant amount of the
decline."1 1 9 This requires some sort of empirically-based damage model,
not mere well-informed speculation from analystsi
20
VI. CONCLUSION
Many courts have rendered opinions during the Survey period affecting
the reach of the TSA. The Texas Supreme Court acknowledged its reach
114. See Unger v. Amedisys Inc., 401 F.3d 316, 322-23 (5th Cir. 2005) (raised on class
certification interlocutory appeal).
115. See Greenberg, 364 F.3d at 665.
116. See FED. R. Civ. P. 23 Advisory Committee Notes to the 2003 Amendments.
117. See 487 F.3d at 270.
118. Although the class action investors had the better of the analysts statements, some
analysts made no mention of the corrective statement, described the management as the
best in the business, or indicated there was no change in the fundamentals of the issuer.
119. See Greenberg, 364 F.3d at 666.
120. The dissenting opinion would affirm. See Oscar Private Equity Invs. v. Allegiance
Telecom, Inc., 487 F.3d 261, 271 (5th Cir. 2007) (Dennis, J., dissenting). As he stated in his
concurring opinion for Regents of the Univ. of California v. Credit Suisse First Boston
(USA), Inc., 482 F.3d 372, 401 (5th Cir. 2007), cert. denied, 128 S. Ct. 1120 (2008), the loss
causation prerequisite violates the fraud-on-the-market presumption of the Supreme Court
by changing the burden of proof from the issuer to the class action investors. Secondly, the
requirement of Greenberg can be satisfied by evidence that the share price moved up im-
mediately following the release of positive information, which happened for these class
action investors, rather than only by a decline on the disclosure of the truthful statement.
Thirdly, the Supreme Court regards reliance and loss causation as two separate elements of
the securities fraud cause of action and should not be intertwined. Fourthly, the majority
dramatically expands the scope of class certification review by effectively requiring mini-
trials on the merits to determine class certification.
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over registration of securities sold and dealers selling from Texas to non-
residents. In contrast, the Fifth Circuit continued Congress's campaign to
limit regulation of interest rate swaps to federal regulatory bodies by de-
fining "security" in the TSA to not include interest rate swaps. A Texas
appellate court determined that lawyers merely preparing the transac-
tional documents for perpetrators of fraud are not subject to liability for
aiding and abetting.
The courts also narrowed the ability of private litigants to use the se-
curities laws as a basis for legal action. A Texas appellate court deter-
mined that the Board's certificates would not support a default judgment.
The Fifth Circuit, continuing Congress's efforts to reduce frivolous securi-
ties fraud class actions, determined that the factual allegations of scienter
relate to the perpetrator's misstatements. The Fifth Circuit also limited
the use of the fraud-on-the-market theory to establish a presumption of
reliance by considering some merit questions at the class certification
stage, litigation and by requiring a perceptible market reaction to correc-
tive disclosure.
